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    Abstract: With the gradual increase of the number of entities participating in the electricity market, it was difficult for classical optimization theory and classic game model to solve the multi-agent behavior decision-making model affected by multiple factors. In view of the centralized bidding behavior of new energy power generators and thermal power generators in the current market environment, a three-subject evolutionary game model under the competitive agency model was established. Based on the limited rationality of the subjects participating in the game and the limited information in the market-oriented environment, the optimal competition strategy of each subject in different stages and different policies were theoretically deduced. This paper analyzes the evolution results, strategic responses and the main factors affecting the decision-making of power generators and government departments through examples, it verifies the effectiveness of evolutionary game in the analysis of multi-agent optimal strategies in the market context, provides suggestions for the behavior of generation side and the policies of government departments.

    Key words: power generation bidding; generation side; evolutionary game; multi-group strategy equilibrium